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DOMESTIC ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS: A
DEBTOR’S FRIEND AND CREDITOR’S FOE
ABSTRACT
In 1997, Alaska enacted the first law in the United States legalizing
Domestic Asset Protection Trusts (DAPTs), also referred to as self-settled
asset protection trusts, as valid legal entities. Under traditional trust law, a
debtor cannot shield assets from creditors by placing them in a trust for his
or her own benefit. Alaska’s statute allowing DAPTs calls the traditional
rule into question. This Note will examine use of DAPTs in the United
States, including whether or not the recently amended Uniform Voidable
Transaction Act would consider any transfer to a DAPT voidable per se,
and discuss an approach that intends to prevent misuse of DAPTs to avoid
liability.
INTRODUCTION
A trust establishes a legal fiduciary arrangement that allows a settlor—
the person who creates a trust—to convey property to a trustee to hold for
one or more beneficiaries. 1 A valid trust requires: “(1) intent by the settlor
to create a trust; (2) ascertainable beneficiaries who can enforce the trust;
and (3) specific property, the res, to be held in trust.” 2 As a legal instrument
and estate planning tool, the trust has had great success, attributable, at least
in part, to its flexibility: given that the essence of the trust is the separation
of legal ownership from beneficial ownership, the essential elements of a
trust are sufficiently minimal to allow many uses.3 Indeed, a trust settlor
typically does not create a trust unless some obstacle—frequently a legal
obstacle—makes it less practical and convenient for the settlor to use some
other financial planning method to achieve his objectives. 4 Given the
flexible uses to which a trust may be put, settlors have often used trusts to
avoid otherwise applicable legal rules—for example, with respect to
transmission of wealth between generations. 5
In the mid-1980s, a number of offshore jurisdictions zeroed in on a new
source of trust business: clients who wished to avoid the reach of creditors
as opposed to taxing authorities. 6 The Cook Islands’ International Trusts
Act of 1984 “applies only to international trusts, and not to trusts created
for the benefit of residents of the Cook Islands . . . .” 7 The statute renders
1. JESSE DUKEMINIER, ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS, TRUSTS, &
ESTATES 385, 391 (10th ed. 2017).
2. Id. at 401 (emphasis omitted).
3. Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Laws Race to the Bottom, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 1035, 1041 (1999).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1048.
7. Id.
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self-settled trusts fully enforceable and indicates that creditors will be
unable to go after the settlor’s interest in an international trust even if the
settlor maintains the ability to terminate or make changes to the trust. 8
Thus, once a settlor’s assets are transferred into a Cook Islands international
trust, the settlor’s creditors may not go after the settlor-beneficiary’s interest
in the trust. 9 Most significantly, the statute prevents creditors from claiming
that a transfer into a Cook Islands international trust is a fraudulent
conveyance. 10 According to the Cook Islands’ International Trusts Act of
1984, even if a creditor proves that the settlor transferred assets into a Cook
Islands trust with the intent to defraud his or her creditor, the creditor may
only reach the trust assets if the settlor was insolvent at the time that the
creditor’s claim arose. 11
In 1997, in a bid to attract out-of-state trust business, Alaska passed the
first Domestic Asset Protection Trust law in the United States.12 Since then,
sixteen other states have enacted laws allowing the creation of Domestic
Asset Protection Trusts (“DAPTs”). 13 A DAPT, otherwise known as a selfsettled spendthrift trust, “is an irrevocable trust established under the laws
of one of the few jurisdictions that allow the settlor of the trust to be a
discretionary beneficiary and yet still protect the trust assets from the
settlor’s creditors.” 14 In other words, a DAPT is a trust created by an
individual for his or her own benefit. 15 DAPTs have become a popular
strategy—albeit one not sufficiently tested—for protecting one’s assets

8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 1048–49.
Id. at 1049.
Id.
Id. Even in the rare cases where a transfer to an international trust is deemed fraudulent,
the Cook Islands’ International Trusts Act of 1984 provides that the creditor must bring his or her
fraudulent transfer claim within one year from the date of the fraudulent transfer. Id. at 1050.
Consequently, under Cook Islands law, the transfers made by the settlor, while he or she is
solvent, will not be voidable. Id. Additionally, the statute declares that “no Cook Islands court
shall enforce or recognize a foreign judgment against a Cook Islands trust, or a settlor, trustee, or
beneficiary of the trust, if the judgment is based on the application law inconsistent with the
statute.” Id.
12. Ashlea Ebeling, Onshore Asset Protection with the Selfie Trust, FORBES (July 6, 2016,
7:48 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2016/07/06/onshore-asset-protection-withthe-selfie-trust/#5fb5d8a81be5.
13. Ashlea Ebeling, Comparing Domestic Asset Protection Trust States, FORBES (July 6, 2016,
6:01 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2016/07/06/comparing-domestic-assetprotection-trust-states/#6331b40b59fd; see also Mark Merric, Daniel G. Worthington, Paul
MacArthur & John E. Sullivan, Best Situs for DAPTs in 2019, WEALTH MGMT.COM (Dec. 13,
2018), https://www.wealthmanagement.com/estate-planning/best-situs-dapts-2019.
14. Steven J. Oshins, The Domestic Asset Protection Trust: Combining It with the Double
Strategy, 27 PROB. & PROP. 22, 23 (2013) [hereinafter Oshins, Combining It with the Double
Strategy].
15. Kellsie J. Nienhuser, Developing Trust in the Self-Settled Spendthrift Trust, 15 WYO. L.
REV. 551, 552 (2015).
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from creditors in the United States. 16 It is common for states, like Alaska, to
enact new statutes that create favorable legal environments to attract new
business. 17 For example, states often compete for corporate charters by
offering attractive governance structures. 18 Delaware also reduced
protections available to shareholders and other interested parties in order to
entice corporate managers to incorporate their respective companies in the
state. 19
Before the establishment of DAPTs in the United States, wealthy
individuals in the United States utilized offshore trusts to hold and protect
their assets. 20 The enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (“Tax Reform
Act”) in the United States eliminated most of the tax advantages for
American settlors of offshore trusts. 21 In an effort to control and reduce the
use of foreign trusts to avoid American income taxes, the Tax Reform Act
provided that the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) “would treat for income
tax purposes the assets of most foreign trusts settled by Americans as the
settlor’s assets.” 22 The Tax Reform Act thus prevented American citizens
from avoiding taxation on their assets in these offshore trusts. 23
For the most part, American courts view offshore protection trusts
unfavorably. 24 In Federal Trade Communication v. Affordable Media, LLC,
the Federal Trade Commission brought an action to recover fraud proceeds
from alleged promoters of a scheme to market fraudulent investments to
consumers. 25 After the promoters refused to comply with the preliminary
injunction requiring repatriation of assets held outside of the United States
in a Cook Islands trust, Judge Lloyd D. George, a district court judge for the
District of Nevada, found the promoters in contempt of court. 26
In Affordable Media, LLC, the Ninth Circuit claimed that “[t]he ‘asset
protection’ aspect of these foreign trusts arises from the ability of people . .
. to frustrate and impede the United States courts by moving their assets
16. Steven J. Oshins, The Domestic Asset Protection Trust: Ranking the Jurisdiction, 26 Prob.
& Prop. 40, 40 (2012) [hereinafter Oshins, Ranking the Jurisdiction]; see also Ronald J. Mann, A
Fresh Look at State Asset Protection Trust Statutes, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1741, 1763–66 (2014).
17. See Sterk, supra note 3, at 1038.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Richard C. Ausness, The Offshore Asset Protection Trust: A Prudent Financial Planning
Device or the Last Refuge of a Scoundrel, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 147, 152 (2007).
21. Sterk, supra note 3, at 1048.
22. Id.
23. See id. Despite the changes in how the offshore trust assets are taxed, the offshore trusts
remain popular with some American settlors because financial institutions in these former British
colonies have maintained the traditional British attitude toward banking secrecy. Id. Because of
this, offshore trusts can be utilized by American settlors willing to engage in tax evasion; indeed,
“[i]f American auditors cannot trace transactions between offshore banks and their clients, the
offshore trust becomes an attractive way to launder money to avoid American tax obligations.” Id.
24. See Ausness, supra note 20, at 182.
25. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1228 (9th Cir. 1999).
26. Id. at 1231.
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beyond those courts’ jurisdictions.” 27 The court then suggested it would
hesitate to accept an impossibility defense to a contempt charge because of
the nature of asset protection trusts. 28 According to the court, “[g]iven that
these offshore trusts operate by means of frustrating domestic courts’
jurisdiction, we are unsure that we would find that the [defendants’]
inability to comply with the district court’s order is a defense to a civil
contempt charge.” 29 The Ninth Circuit was ultimately unconvinced by the
defendants’ arguments that they could not comply with the district court’s
order. 30 The Ninth Circuit pointed to foreign laws (such as the Cook
Islands’ International Trusts Act of 1984) intended to disrupt domestic
courts and foreign trustees acting in concert with domestic persons to thwart
judicial processes in U.S. courts. 31 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit cautioned
courts to be wary of “accepting a defendant’s assertions that repatriation or
other compliance with a court’s order concerning a foreign trust is
impossible.” 32
In 1997, Alaska and Delaware began competing with offshore locations
for trust business by allowing asset protection trusts. 33 These states are not
able to match the vast range of protections available in the Cook Islands and
other offshore jurisdictions; however, they offer easier access to the trust’s
assets, reduced costs associated with trust creation, and fewer risks
associated with political stability than some offshore locations.34 These
advantages attract trusts to DAPT states despite offering less asset
protection than offshore trusts. 35
A DAPT provides similar barriers to creditors without some of the
problems associated with offshore trusts. 36 Traditionally, DAPTs do not
shield the settlor or the beneficiary from claims of creditors.37 However, the
relatively new state statutes allowing DAPTs represent a shift from that
traditional rule. 38
In 2014, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws agreed to a set of amendments to the 1984 Uniform Fraudulent

27. Id. at 1240.
28. Ausness, supra note 20, at 182. An impossibility defense is a criminal defense used

occasionally when “a defendant’s actions would not constitute a crime, even if they were carried
out fully and exactly as he intended.” Masika v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 757 S.E.2d 571, 573
(Va. App. 2014).
29. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d at 1240.
30. See id.
31. Id. at 1241.
32. Id.
33. Sterk, supra note 3, at 1051.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See Nienhuser, supra note 15, at 556.
38. Id. at 558.
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Transfer Act (UFTA). 39 In addition to other changes, the amendments
renamed the UFTA the “Uniform Voidable Transactions Act” (UVTA). 40
As of 2014, the UFTA had been adopted by forty-three states, the District
of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 41 The impetus for the
amendments to the UFTA was a desire to codify a choice of law rule for
fraudulent or voidable transfers, resulting in lower litigation costs,
particularly involving disputes over choice of law. 42 Additionally, there are
four significant changes to the UFTA reflected in the UVTA:
1. A choice of law provision, requiring the voidable transaction law of
the debtor’s “location” to govern the voidable transaction claim;
2. The UVTA clarifies that the creditor’s burden of proving intent to
hinder, delay or defraud is by a “preponderance of evidence” as opposed
to “clear and convincing evidence”—a standard used by some courts;
3. The UVTA identifies “series” LLCs and clarifies that transactions
between a series and another series can be viewed as voidable
transactions; and
4. The term fraudulent is replaced with “voidable,” reflecting the fact
that fraud (in its common law sense) is not a requirement for setting aside
a transfer. 43

The UVTA also includes an updated “Official Comments” section that
clarifies the above changes and includes citations to updated case law. 44
The legal doctrine of “‘fraudulent conveyance’ . . . defines the limits of
a debtor’s right to deal with its property [in relation to] its creditors.” 45 This
doctrine originated in Roman law, and English common law later borrowed
from it. 46 In 1571, the English Statute of 13 Elizabeth established the rule
for fraudulent conveyances followed today—and laid out in both the UFTA
and the UVTA—which “render[] voidable any transfer of property by a
debtor made with ‘intent to hinder, delay, or defraud’ creditors.” 47 Because
DAPTs provide barriers to creditors seeking access to debtors’ assets, one
39. Kenneth C. Kettering, The Uniform Voidable Transactions Act; or, the 2014 Amendments
to the Fraudulent Transfer Act, 70 BUS. LAW. 777, 777 (2015).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 779 n.11. There are seven states that have not adopted the UFTA or its successor, the
UVTA. Id. New York and Maryland retained the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (the
precursor to the UFTA), whereas Alaska, Kentucky, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Virginia have
“idiosyncratic” laws concerning fraudulent transfers. Id.
42. Id. at 780.
43. Mark D. Hildreth & David J. Slenn, The Uniform Voidable Transactions Act in a Nutshell,
LEXOLOGY (Jul. 27, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8d9b04d9-03ed4903-89c2-1dd78ce9c668.
44. Id.
45. Kettering, supra note 39, at 778.
46. Id.
47. Id.; see also UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(A)(1) (1984); UNIF. VOIDABLE
TRANSACTIONS ACT § 4(A)(1) (2014).
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must consider whether transfers to DAPTs are fraudulent since the barriers
they create can serve to “hinder, delay, or defraud” creditors.
Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of some basic trust law
concepts. Part II discusses DAPTs, their purposes and how their treatment
differs within the seventeen states that have enacted statutes allowing them.
Part III addresses fraudulent transfer law, first in the 1984 UFTA and, more
recently, in the UVTA introduced in 2014, and how these statutes handle
DAPTs. Part IV examines and weighs public policy arguments for and
against prohibiting the use of DAPTs, and different issues of liability
introduced by DAPTs. Finally, Part V discusses solutions addressing the
public policy concerns surrounding DAPTs, specifically issues surrounding
corporate irresponsibility and piercing the corporate veil. Part V also
suggests how a combination of amending DAPT statutes and adopting the
UVTA will disincentivize corporate officers from engaging in misbehavior
and mitigate the public policy concerns.
I. TRUST LAW CONCEPTS, DEFINITIONS, AND
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A trust is a property management arrangement commonly used in estate
planning. 48 Specifically, a trust is an “asset-management device that divides
the burdens and benefits of ownership of property between a trustee, on the
one hand, and beneficiaries, on the other.” 49 This division of ownership
interests between the trustee and the beneficiaries generates a fiduciary
relationship between them. 50 There are several elements required when
creating a trust. 51 A trust requires a settlor, a trustee, and a beneficiary;
three different persons, however, are not necessary for a trust. 52 A settlor is
“someone who makes a settlement of property; especially, one who sets up
a trust.” 53 A beneficiary is someone who is “designated to benefit from an
appointment, disposition, or assignment (as in a will, insurance policy, etc.),
or to receive something as a result of a legal arrangement or instrument.” 54
A trustee is “someone who stands in a fiduciary or confidential relation to
another; especially one who, having legal title to property, holds it in trust

48. Patrick M. Wilson, Protecting Investors from their Investments: Encouraging States to
Make Assets in Domestic Asset Protection Trusts Available to Creditors who have Successfully
Pierced the Corporate Veil, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 791, 796 (2010).
49. Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS L.J.
287, 290 (2002).
50. Id.
51. Wilson, supra note 48, at 796.
52. Id. at 796 n.18.
53. Settlor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). A settlor is sometimes also referred
to as a “grantor.” Id.
54. Beneficiary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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for the benefit of another and owes a fiduciary duty to that beneficiary.” 55
Typically,
a trustee’s duties are to convert to cash all debts and securities that are not
qualified legal investments, to reinvest the cash in proper securities, to
protect and preserve the trust property, and to ensure that it is employed
solely for the beneficiary, in accordance with the directions contained in
the trust instrument. 56

When an individual establishes a trust, he (the property owner) transfers
his assets to a trustee. 57 This transfer is typically coupled with “a written
trust instrument that sets forth the terms of the trust, including both the
dispositive provisions (i.e., the instructions for how the trustee is to dispose
of the assets) and the administrative provisions (which specify most powers
and obligations of the trustee in managing the assets).” 58 The terms of the
trust instrument outline the rights and obligations of the trustee and the
beneficiaries based on principles developed through decisions by courts of
equity defining and enforcing the interests of trust beneficiaries. 59 Trust law
may also be altered by state statute.60 Several states have enacted statutes
allowing DAPTs, which allow the settlor to be a beneficiary of his or her
own trust, a shift from traditional trust law.61
II. DOMESTIC ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS IN THE UNITED
STATES
Historically, prior to the enactment of state statutes permitting DAPTs,
courts found DAPTs inherently fraudulent because they allow debtors to
protect themselves and their assets from the claims of creditors. 62
Therefore, for the most part, courts have found DAPTs to be unenforceable;
consequently, once a court finds a spendthrift provision unenforceable,
creditors are able obtain judgments from the trust assets. 63
Recently, however, a number of states enacted statutes that allow
settlors to legally shield assets from creditors in DAPTs. 64 There are
currently seventeen states in the United States that have enacted such
statutes. 65
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Trustee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Id.
Danforth, supra note 49, at 290.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 291.
Wilson, supra note 48, at 798.
Nienhuser, supra note 15, at 552.
Id.
Id.
Ebeling, supra note 12. Alaska and Delaware legalized DAPTs in 1997; Rhode Island and
Nevada legalized DAPTs in 1999; Utah legalized DAPTs in 2003; Oklahoma legalized DAPTs in
2004; South Dakota and Missouri legalized DAPTs in 2005; Wyoming and Tennessee legalized
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The Alaska statute allowing DAPTs—the first in the United States—
became effective April 2, 1997. 66 Alaska’s statute allows “a trust settlor to
include an enforceable restriction on the power of creditors to reach the
settlor’s discretionary interest in the trust principal or income,” so long as
the following four criteria are met: “(1) the transfer into the trust was not
fraudulent; (2) the settlor did not reserve a right to revoke; (3) the trust
instrument does not require any distribution of the trust income or principal
to the settlor; and (4) the settlor is not, at the time of the transfer, in default
by thirty or more days on payments due under a child support judgment or
order.” 67 This means that if a settlor establishes a discretionary trust where
the trustee has ultimate control over distribution of all or part of the income
to the settlor, the settlor’s creditors may not reach the trust principal unless
that transfer into the trust was fraudulent.68 Furthermore, Alaska’s
fraudulent conveyance law is unfriendly to creditors.69 Alaska has not
adopted the UVTA, the UFTA, or the UFTA’s predecessor, the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act (“UFCA”).70 In fact, the Alaska fraudulent
conveyance statute requires proof of actual fraud and does not include any
conception of constructive fraud. 71 Under the Alaska DAPT statute, a
creditor is unable to make “any fraudulent transfer claim after four years
from the time of the transfer, even if the creditor’s claim did not arise until
after the transfer.” 72 Therefore, if a settlor establishes an Alaska DAPT,
“anticipating and seeking to avoid possible future liability,” the settlor will
be successful in thwarting his creditors “so long as the liability does not
arise—or the creditor does not [bring a claim]—within four years after the
settlor makes the transfer of property into the trust.” 73
Alaska became an even more attractive situs (or place of administration
of a trust) to trust settlors following the 1998 amendments to its DAPT
statute. 74 These amendments allowed the settlor of an existing trust
established in another state or foreign jurisdiction to change the trust’s situs
to Alaska. 75 The legislature also “made it clear that a fraudulent transfer
into an Alaska trust would not be set aside in toto, but ‘only to the extent

DAPTs in 2007; New Hampshire legalized DAPTs in 2009; Hawaii legalized DAPTs in 2010;
Virginia legalized DAPTs in 2012; Ohio legalized DAPTs in 2013; Mississippi legalized DAPTs
in 2014; and West Virginia legalized DAPTs in 2016. Id.
66. Randall J. Gingiss, Putting a Stop to Asset Protection Trusts, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 987,
1008 (1999).
67. Sterk, supra note 3, at 1051.
68. Id. at 1051–52.
69. Id. at 1052.
70. Id.
71. Id. see infra note 107–120 and accompanying text.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1053.
75. Id.
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necessary to satisfy the settlor’s debt to the creditor or other person at
whose instance the trust or property transfer is voided or set aside.’” 76
Each jurisdiction that allows DAPTs has a statute of limitations period
that determines how long is necessary between the date of transfer to the
DAPT and the date on which the transferred asset will be protected from the
settlor’s creditors. 77 The statute of limitations differs for preexisting
creditors versus non-preexisting creditors. 78 In Utah, for example, there is
no statute of limitations for a future creditor.79 In Nevada, on the other
hand, the statute of limitations for a future creditor is two years. 80 Indeed,
all states that allow DAPTs, except for Nevada, have certain “exception
creditor” statutes that allow specific classes of creditors to access the trust
assets even though most creditors would normally be barred by statute. 81
Exception creditors might include divorcing spouses or a child support
creditor. 82
Steven J. Oshins, a Nevada practitioner who frequently utilizes DAPTs
for his clients, ranks Nevada as the DAPT jurisdiction most favorable to
debtors. 83 Nevada has a short statute of limitations period and does not
include any exception creditors and thus, no special classes of creditors that
can pierce through the trust. 84
While viewed as a favorable tool for debtors, DAPTs may impose
exorbitant expenses upon a creditor who is attempting to access a debtor’s
DAPT assets under fraudulent transfer law or general trust law. 85 An asset
protection plan is considered successful if it either “(1) causes the potential
plaintiff to avoid filing a lawsuit altogether or if it (2) causes the potential
plaintiff to settle the dispute for less money than the amount that would
have been owed on the debt.” 86 Nevada is noteworthy in that unlike most
other DAPT jurisdictions, Nevada does not exempt divorcing spouses from
the protections of the DAPT. 87

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Oshins, Combining It with the Double Strategy, supra note 14, at 23.
Oshins, Ranking the Jurisdiction, supra note 16, at 40.
Steven J. Oshins, 8th Annual Domestic Asset Protection Trust State Rankings Chart (Apr.
2017), https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/b211fb_27c14ad60a414a2986e667d0fcd79049.pdf. This
chart, created by Steven J. Oshins, a Las Vegas-based DAPT lawyer, ranks the states that allow
DAPTs from most debtor-friendly (Nevada) to least debtor-friendly (Utah). Id. Note that
Oklahoma, Virginia, and West Virginia are not ranked. Id.
80. Id.
81. Oshins, Combining It with the Double Strategy, supra note 14, at 23.
82. Id.
83. Oshins, Ranking the Jurisdiction, supra note 16, at 41.
84. Id.
85. See David J. Cook, Hitting Bottom in 17 States and the Suppression of Liability, 43 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 277, 279 (2017).
86. Oshins, supra note 9, at 23.
87. Id.
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III. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER LAW AND TRANSFERS OF
ASSETS TO TRUSTS
Some scholars and practitioners compare asset protection planning to
tax planning: “To do tax planning properly and legally, it must be done
within the rules set forth in the tax code and tax regulations. In asset
protection planning, the parallel rules are, in essence, the laws of fraudulent
transfer.” 88 Thus, one cannot discuss DAPTs and other asset protection
planning devices without considering how they relate to the law of
fraudulent transfers.
In the United States, the asset protection characteristics of DAPTs were
not available to trust settlors who were also beneficiaries of the trust until
1997. 89 This rule originates from a fifteenth century English statute90 which
declared that “all deeds of gift and goods and chattels made or to be made
[in] trust, to the use of that person or persons that made the same deed of
gift, be void and of none effect.” 91 The spirit of this rule was later
encapsulated in the UFTA and, more recently, UVTA. 92
One of the key reasons for states adopting the UFTA was to make state
law conform with the Bankruptcy Reform Act’s changes in federal
bankruptcy fraudulent transfer law. 93 The purpose of the UFTA is to
“protect unsecured and undersecured creditors from the effects of debtor
transfers designed to frustrate creditors’ efforts to collect on debts.” 94
Under the UFTA, a creditor may “reach a settlor’s beneficial interest in
a trust even if the settlor did not intend to defraud creditors with his initial
transfer into the trust.” 95 Scholar Stewart Sterk provides the following
example:
Suppose, however, the settlor creates a trust in which she disguises her
beneficial interest. Imagine, for instance, an irrevocable trust in which the
settlor declares herself trustee, retains discretion to make income payments
among her three children, and reserves the power to appoint the principal
from among her children at the time of her death. In this case, the legal
limitations on self-settled trusts would not apply, because the settlor has
not retained an enforceable beneficial interest in the trust. Moreover, the

88. Duncan E. Osborne & John A. Terrill, II, Fundamentals of Asset Protection Planning, 31
ACTEC J. 319, 321 (2006).
89. Danforth, supra note 49, at 292.
90. Id. at 292–93.
91. Id. (citing Fraudulent Deed of Gifts Act of 1487, 3 Hen. 7, c. 4 (1487)).
92. See generally UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT (1984); UNIF. VOIDABLE
TRANSACTIONS ACT (2014).
93. See John E. Sullivan, III, Future Creditors and Fraudulent Transfers: When a Claimant
Doesn’t have a Claim, When a Transfer Isn’t a Transfer, When Fraud Doesn’t Stay Fraudulent,
and Other Important Limits to Fraudulent Transfers Law for the Asset Protection Planner, 22
DEL. J. CORP. L. 955, 960 (1997).
94. Id. at 961.
95. Sterk, supra note 3, at 1044.
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settlor’s creditors would not be entitled to reach the children’s interests.
On the other hand, the settlor could use her power to allocate income and
appoint the principal to assure that her children are attentive to her needs
and desires. Fraudulent transfer law, however, may enable the settlor’s
creditors to invalidate her transfer to the trust. 96

Section 4 of the UFTA, “Transfers Fraudulent as to Present and Future
Creditors,” reads:
A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor, whether the creditor’s claim arose before or after the transfer was
made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or
incurred the obligation . . . with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
any creditor of the debtor[.] 97

This language highlights the tension between asset protection planning
and the UFTA. 98 Indeed, if the UFTA’s terms are to be interpreted both
literally and broadly, then “asset protection planning is nothing but an illicit
attempt to defraud creditors.” 99 Accordingly, a transfer may “be fraudulent
as to a creditor with no claim outstanding against the transferor at the time
of the transfer.” 100 “Both the statutory language and history of the UFTA
support the view that a transfer can be fraudulent even if the transferor had
no creditors at the time of the transfer.” 101 As a result, if “a creditor can
prove that the settlor transferred property into trust with the intent to
defraud some present or future creditor, any creditor—even one whose
claim had not arisen, and was not anticipated, at the time the transfer was
made—may set aside the transfer [as fraudulent].” 102 Transferors, however,
are not obligated to account for future debts that are not reasonably
foreseeable—they must only take into account reasonably foreseeable
future liabilities. 103 Passage of time, notice to prospective creditors, and
other concepts limit the scope of Section 4(a) of the UFTA and its
availability to future creditors.104
The UFTA addresses two types of fraud, referred to as “actual” and
“constructive” fraud.105 In the case of actual fraud, the only relevant factor
is the transferor’s intent at the time of the transfer. 106 The UFTA allows the

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(A) (1984).
See Sullivan, III, supra note 93, at 957.
Id.
Sterk, supra note 3, at 1045.
Id. at 1045–46.
Id. at 1046.
See Sullivan, III, supra note 93, at 958.
Id.
Id. at 962–63.
Id. at 963.
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fact finder to consider a range of factors referred to as “badges of fraud” to
prove actual fraud. 107 The “badges of fraud” include whether:
1) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
2) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred
after the transfer;
3) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
4) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor
had been sued or threatened with suit;
5) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor’s assets;
6) the debtor absconded;
7) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
8) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably
equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the
obligation incurred;
9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer
was made or the obligation was incurred;
10) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt
was incurred; and
11) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor
who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor. 108

These badges of fraud provide circumstantial evidence from which the
fact finder may infer fraudulent intent. 109 Courts permit these logical
inferences because of the difficulty involved in proving fraudulent intent.110
Since defendants rarely admit fraudulent intent and often only a defendant
knows his own motivation at the time of a transfer, it is unlikely that a
plaintiff will discover any direct proof of bad motives. 111 Accordingly, the
law permits “the badges [of fraud] to act as a substitute for direct proof of
intent and allows, but does not require, the fact finder [to infer] bad intent
from them.” 112 It is important to note that no single badge of fraud
establishes a presumption of bad intent; any badge, however, may
contribute to proving fraudulent intent. 113 Consequently, even the most
damning badge of fraud—that is, a transfer made during the pendency of a
lawsuit—is frequently insufficient to prove fraudulent intent without
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 968.
UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(B)(1)–(11) (1984).
See Sullivan, III, supra note 93, at 969–70.
Id. at 970.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 971.
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additional badges of fraud. 114 Additionally, the law requires the fact finder
to consider any evidence negating the defendant’s fraudulent intent.115
Constructive fraud, on the other hand, focuses on economic effect and
does not consider intent. 116 Instead, to prove constructive fraud, the UFTA
requires creditors to prove that the debtor transferred an asset or incurred a
debt “without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the
transfer or obligation” 117 and the debtor “was engaged or was about to
engage in a business or transaction for which the remaining assets of the
debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction [;
or] intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he
[or she] would incur, debts beyond his [or her] ability to pay as they became
due.” 118
The language of Section 4(a) of the UVTA is nearly identical to that of
the UFTA; the UVTA simply substitutes the word “voidable” for
“fraudulent.” 119 The Official Comments for Section 4 of the UVTA are
more comprehensive than those of the UFTA. Official Comment 2 to
Section 4 of the UVTA reads:
Section 4, unlike § 5, protects creditors of a debtor whose claims arise
after as well as before the debtor made or incurred the challenged transfer
or obligation. Similarly, there is no requirement in § 4(a)(1) that the intent
referred to be directed at a creditor existing or identified at the time of
transfer or incurrence. For example, promptly after the invention in
Pennsylvania of the spendthrift trust, the assets and beneficial interest of
which are immune from attachment by the beneficiary’s creditors, courts
held that a debtor’s establishment of a spendthrift trust for the debtor’s
own benefit is a voidable transfer under the Statute of 13 Elizabeth,
without regard to whether the transaction is directed at an existing or
identified creditor . . . Likewise, for centuries § 4(a)(1) and its
predecessors have been employed to invalidate nonpossessory property
interests that are thought to be potentially deceptive, without regard to
whether the deception is directed at an existing or identified creditor . . .
Section 4(a)(1) has the meaning elaborated in the preceding paragraph, but
it is of course possible that a jurisdiction in which this Act is in force
might enact other legislation that modifies the results of the particular
examples given to illustrate that meaning. For example, some states have
enacted legislation authorizing the establishment and funding of self114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 965.
UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(A)(2) (1984).
Id.; see also Sullivan, III, supra note 93, at 965.
Section 4(a)(1) of the UVTA reads: “[a] transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is
voidable as to a creditor, whether the creditor[‘]s claim arose before or after the transfer was made
or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation: (1) with
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor[.]” UNIF. VOIDABLE
TRANSACTIONS ACT § 4(A)(1) (2014).

456

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 13

settled spendthrift trusts, subject to specified conditions. In such a state,
such legislation will supersede the historical interpretation referred to in
the preceding paragraph, either expressly or by necessary implication,
with respect to allowed transfers to such a statutorily-validated trust. 120

Before 1997, when Alaska enacted the first statute validating DAPTs,
American courts universally held transfers to such trusts as ineffective
against creditors. 121 Indeed, black letter law considers a transfer to a selfsettled spendthrift trust “repugnant to fraudulent transfer law.” 122
However, Kenneth Kettering, the Reporter for the Drafting Committee
on Amendments to the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act, explains that
the comments are “carefully worded to recognize that it is not necessarily
the case that all courts in all states will always follow that historical
interpretation.” 123 Comment 8 to Section 4 of the UVTA addresses the
jurisdictional issues that arise with fraudulent transfer law and the
establishment of DAPTs. 124 This comment directly addresses jurisdictions
that allow DAPTs and how courts might handle transfers made to those
DAPTs. 125 Additionally, “the original motivation for the 2014 amendments
was to codify a choice of law rule for voidable transfers”; the amendments
address this by adding a new Section 10 in the UVTA. 126 Neither the UFTA
nor its predecessor, the UFCA, mention choice of law. 127 As a result, choice
of law issues concerning claims brought under the UFTA and UFCA were

120. UNIF. VOIDABLE TRANSACTIONS ACT § 4 cmt. 2 (2014).
121. Kenneth C. Kettering, The Comments to the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act Relating

to Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts are Correct, 42 Ests., Gifts & Trs. J. 1, 3 (2017).
122. Id. at 4.
123. Id. at 5.
124. Comment 8 to Section 4 of the UVTA reads:
Because the laws of different jurisdictions differ in their tolerance of particular creditor-thwarting
devices, choice of law considerations may be important in interpreting § 4(a)(1) as in force in a
given jurisdiction. For example, as noted in Comment 2, the language of § 4(a)(1) historically has
been interpreted to render voidable a transfer to a self-settled spendthrift trust. Suppose that
jurisdiction X, in which this Act is in force, also has in force a statute permitting an individual to
establish a self-settled spendthrift trust and transfer assets thereto, subject to stated conditions. If
an individual Debtor whose principal residence is in X establishes such a trust and transfers assets
thereto, then under § 10 of this Act the voidable transfer law of X applies to that transfer. That
transfer cannot be considered voidable in itself under § 4(a)(1) as in force in X, for the legislature
of X, having authorized the establishment of such trusts, must have expected them to be used.
(Other facts might still render the transfer voidable under X’s enactment of § 4(a)(1).) By contrast,
if Debtor’s principal residence is in jurisdiction Y, which also has enacted this Act but has no
legislation validating such trusts, and if Debtor establishes such a trust under the law of X and
transfers assets to it, then the result would be different. Under § 10 of this Act, the voidable
transfer law of Y would apply to the transfer. If Y follows the historical interpretation referred to
in Comment 2, the transfer would be voidable under § 4(a)(1) as in force in Y.
UNIF. VOIDABLE TRANSACTIONS ACT § 4 cmt. 8 (2014).
125. See id.
126. Kettering, supra note 39, at 794.
127. Id. Kettering argues that the reason why the UFTA did not contain a choice of law rule was
“mere inertia.” Id. at 796.
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addressed by common law. 128 The motivation behind establishing a
statutory rule for choice of law is that voidable transfer law has become an
important concern for lawyers structuring transactions for their clients. 129
The inability to predict which jurisdiction’s voidable transfer law will apply
to a transaction added to the cost of transactions and the costs associated
with litigation. 130
Other practitioners and advocates for the use of asset protection trusts in
estate planning argue that all of the Official Comments to the UVTA should
be deleted and replaced with language “that reflects the actual state of the
law.” 131 The comments state that a transfer to a DAPT is a voidable transfer
per se, and, therefore, an individual who does not live in a state that allows
DAPTs “cannot protect assets from even a mere potential future (and
unknown) creditor by creating a [DAPT] in a state that recognizes
[DAPTs].” 132 Critics argue that the comments are “erroneous and do not in
any way reflect the actual state of the law in this regard” and that “states
considering adopting the UVTA should delete and disavow the comments
and replace them with language that reflects the actual state of the law.” 133
They attribute the flawed comments to the Reporter’s personal feelings
about DAPTs: “[r]egrettably, the Reporter’s comments about [DAPTs]
appear to reflect his individual disapproval of these vehicles and, perhaps,
on that basis, seriously misstate the law.” 134
A recently published article responds to such criticism and argues that
the Official Comments to the UVTA “merely point out that, for more than
150 years, courts have unanimously held that such a transfer [to a DAPT] is
not consistent with fraudulent transfer law.” 135 The article further explains
that “legislatures do not enact comments to a uniform act, and courts are not
bound by them.” 136 Instead, these comments “will state the drafters’
purposes in choosing particular statutory language, and judges find the
comments instructive when interpreting such new language.” 137 Most
importantly, the basic rule of the UFTA and UVTA is not newly drafted
and its language has not changed for almost 500 years; the basic rule has
“declared voidable any transfer of property by a debtor made with ‘intent to

128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 794.
Id. at 795.
Id.
George D. Karibjanian, Richard W. Nenno, & Daniel S. Rubin, The Uniform Voidable
Transactions Act: Why Transfers to Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts by Settlors in Non-APT States
are not Voidable Transfers Per Se, BLOOMBERG BNA: TAX MGMT. EST., GIFTS & TR. J. 2 (2017),
https://www.mosessinger.com/uploads/17tmeg4revisedKaribjanian-Nenno-Rubin.pdf.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 4.
135. Id. at 1–2.
136. Id. at 2.
137. Id.
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hinder, delay, or defraud’ any creditor of the debtor.” 138 Indeed, the
comments simply compile cases that have applied that approximately 500year-old language. 139
IV. PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS AGAINST AND IN FAVOR OF
DAPTS
There are significant incentives that favor allowing DAPTs.140 For
example, the United States benefits economically from state statutes
allowing DAPTs because they bring trust business to local banks, lawyers,
and trust companies. 141 As a multi-billion-dollar-a-year business, DAPTs
can lead to additional revenue for local banks, trust companies, and estate
planners. 142 DAPTs’ popularity is attributed to the fact that trusts provide
beneficiaries with more privacy and autonomy than other estate planning
and wealth management strategies. 143 The state statutes allowing DAPTs
also encourage significant domestic investment and render offshore trusts
unnecessary. 144 Some scholars, however, argue that there is no consistent
evidence that allowing DAPTs boosts a state’s trust business. 145
Another argument for DAPTs indicates that the “traditional rule against
[DAPTs] favors inherited wealth over earned wealth.” 146 For example, most
states permit wealthy individuals to create a spendthrift trust that is
designed to benefit another individual—for example, a child or
grandchild. 147 In doing so, the settlor prophylactically protects his wealth
from the younger generation’s creditors. 148 Conversely, individuals who
become wealthy on their own—i.e., not through inheritance or a spendthrift
trust—are unable to similarly protect themselves from creditors. 149 By
allowing self-settled spendthrift trusts, states eliminate the disparity
between protections afforded to those persons who acquire wealth and those
who inherit it. 150
DAPTs also allow professionals and small business owners to
participate in socially beneficial activities without a stifling concern of

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
See Nienhuser, supra note 15, at 564.
Id.
Nicole F. Stowell, Erik Johanson & Carl Pacini, The Use of Wills and Asset Protection
Trusts in Fraud and Other Financial Crimes, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 509, 526 (2017).
143. Id. at 527.
144. Nienhuser, supra note 15, at 564.
145. See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust
Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 411 (2005).
146. See Ausness, supra note 20, at 187.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.

2019]

Domestic Asset Protection Trusts

459

being bankrupted due to massive civil liability. 151 Unlike large businesses
that can protect themselves from excessive liability, “individuals like
physicians, lawyers, stockbrokers, financial planners, architects, farmers,
and small business owners” do not enjoy the same protections. 152
Additionally, juries are increasingly willing to award large punitive
damages; the prospect of exposure to enormous damage awards effectively
deters individuals “from engaging in socially useful, but risky,
activities.” 153
On the other hand, DAPTs have received significant criticism. 154
Opponents argue that DAPTs “give unexampled opportunity to
unscrupulous persons to shelter their property before engaging in
speculative business enterprises . . . .” 155 Indeed, DAPTs encourage
individuals to engage in careless or questionable behavior with the comfort
that they are protected from losing their shielded assets. 156 While
spendthrift trusts were originally utilized to protect the assets of fiscally
irresponsible beneficiaries and to keep fortunes within the family, the use of
these trusts has expanded into a protective device against creditors of
responsible beneficiaries. 157 DAPTs take this one step further because they
shield both the settlor and the settlor-as-beneficiary from liability.
Additionally, settlors stand to benefit from DAPTs because they may
permit them to shield their trust property from involuntary creditors like tort
claimants. 158 Thus, DAPTs can act as “a safeguard against financial
uncertainties and unanticipated litigation.” 159 For those who view the
United States litigation system as pro-plaintiff, frequently providing
plaintiffs with “more than their fair share when it comes monetary
judgments,” DAPTs may effectively protect their settlors from meritless
claims and frivolous litigation.160 With the view that wealthy or “deep
pocket” defendants risk becoming frequent targets of tort litigation, DAPTs
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Id. at 187–88.
Id. at 188.
Nienhuser, supra note 15, at 561.
Ausness, supra note 20, at 184.
See Kevin R. McKinnis, The Good, the Bad, and a New Kind of Prenup: An Analysis of
the Ohio Legacy Trust Act and What Asset Protection Trusts Will Mean for Ohio, 61 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 1105, 1125 (2013).
157. Susanna C. Brennan, Changes in Climate: The Movement of Asset Protection Trusts from
International to Domestic Shores and its Effect on Creditors’ Rights, 79 OR. L. REV. 755, 761
(2000).
158. Nienhuser, supra note 15, at 563.
159. Id. (citing Susanna C. Brennan, Changes in Climate: The Movement of Asset Protection
Trusts from International to Domestic Shores and its Effect on Creditor’s Rights, 79 OR. L. REV.
755, 765 (2000) (“The growing popularity of asset protection and its supporting industry most
likely occurred in response to economic and social factors including the increase in litigation and
legal liability.”).
160. Id.
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serve less as a vehicle to avoid debts and more as a shield for wealthy
individuals who fear “losing everything they have spent years earning.” 161
The approach described above is “liability suppression, front and
center.” 162 The suggestion that “a person should not pay an unjust bill
[embraces a position] of civil and legal disorder.” 163 However, a response to
this argument explains:
To many Americans, parking tickets, taxes and cell phone bills are
“unjust,” but they are nonetheless paid timely. If [author] worries about
“deep pockets,” this worry is unfounded. The inference is that “deep
pockets” attract shakedown lawsuits. The other inference that some “tort
litigation” is meritless which presumptively might include all mass torts . .
. . The uninsured class of claims is the intentional torts, and that includes
sexual assaults, hate crimes, domestic violence and mayhem, murder,
battery, toxic torts, and the endless lists of financial injuries. If the
property of the perpetrator is immunized, these wrongdoers further
exacerbate the anguish, pain, and permanent losses suffered by the victims
of uninsured torts who are cheated out of any recompense, including a
sense of justice in the collection of the judgment. DAPTs suppress liability
by rendering the defendant near “judgment proof,” precluding potential
enforcement, and deterring counsel from accepting an uncollectible case.
[Author] suggests that plaintiffs bring “meritless claims” which threaten
“individuals [with] losing everything they have spent years earning. 164

Furthermore, “DAPTs provide a closely aligned method to immunize
the assets of a debtor from the enforcement of a civil judgment and
therefore suppress the burgeoning liability footprint in the face of tort
claimants who face terrible barriers seeking compensation for grievous
losses.” 165 Similar to a tort claimant, many worker’s compensation carriers,
first party insurers, medical, health care, and rehabilitation providers file
claims for compensation that arise from an accident, personal injury
settlement or judgments for their advances. 166
Creditors may take on enormous legal expenses when seeking to access
their debtors’ assets under the UVTA or general trust law. 167 Moreover,
“DAPTs are quintessential asset protection schemes that seek to, and even
succeed in, thwarting an involuntary creditor from access to the assets of
the recalcitrant debtor to satisfy a large tort judgment.” 168 Indeed, states
allowing DAPTs address the increased demand for trust business and
incoming flow of capital that are attractive to the business and trust
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
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communities. 169 “Suppression of liability, by statute no less, is the
marketing ploy that the liability districts peddle for the benefit of their ‘trust
business.’” 170
Other critics argue that DAPTs are “inherently fraudulent.” 171 If DAPTs
were enforceable, it would provide ample “opportunity to unscrupulous
persons to shelter their property before engaging in speculative business
enterprises, to mislead creditors into thinking that the settlor still owned the
property since he appeared to be receiving its income, and thereby work a
gross fraud on creditors who might place reliance on the former prosperity
and financial stability of the debtor.” 172
Finally, although a DAPT settlor’s assets are protected from creditors,
the trustee of the DAPT may be at risk for suit in their personal capacity as
a trustee. 173 Currently, it is unclear whether courts will “respect the asset
protection objective or, if they do, leave trustees holding the proverbial
bag.” 174 Every American jurisdiction except for Mississippi and West
Virginia has adopted either the Uniform Trust Code or the Uniform Probate
Code (or other statutes like them); these uniform laws “separate the trust
entity from the trustee, severing the liability of the trust from the liability of
the trustee, and allowing suit against the trustee in its representative
capacity as opposed to its personal capacity.” 175 The Alaska, Delaware,
South Dakota, and Utah DAPT provisions prohibit actions against the
trustee of valid asset protection trusts. 176
The Uniform Probate Code or Uniform Trust Code do not require a
claimant to proceed against a trustee in his representative capacity, but
allows a claimant to do so. 177 This does, however, create a potential risk for
trustees of DAPTs in jurisdictions that do not provide specific trustee
protection: a creditor action brought against the trustee in its personal
capacity may result in the protection of assets, but the risk is that the trustee
is not protected and will be held personally liable for the claim with no
ability to recover from the trust. 178
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Id. at 288.
Id. at 288–89.
Ausness, supra note 20, at 184.
Id. (citing GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 40 (6th ed. 1987)).
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Trustees?, 21 PROB. & PROP. 58, 58 (2007).
174. Id.
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V. DAPTS AND PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
A compelling approach to curbing corporate malfeasance and liability
avoidance using DAPTs is to amend DAPT statutes to permit the assets
contained within a corporate officer’s DAPT to be accessible to victims of
corporate irresponsibility who are able to successfully pierce the corporate
veil of the officer’s corporation. 179 Corporate irresponsibility and
malfeasance has resulted in “devastating financial losses” for many
Americans. 180 This approach, by allowing victims [of corporate
malfeasance] to access corporate officers’ assets located within DAPTs,
may have the added benefit of deterring fraudulent behavior by corporate
officers. 181
A plaintiff must pierce the corporate veil in order to place individual
liability on corporate officers, shareholders, and directors for corporate
actions. 182 However, “[p]iercing the corporate veil is not favored and in
general, courts are reluctant to do so.” 183 In order to pierce the corporate
veil, plaintiffs must establish that “(1) ‘the owner exercised complete
domination over the corporation with respect to the transaction at issue,’
such that it is an alter ego of the corporation, and (2) ‘such domination was
used to commit a fraud or wrong that injured the party seeking to pierce the
veil.’” 184 A plaintiff may only pierce the corporate veil after showing that a
corporation’s owner or corporate officer has engaged in fraud or is using the
corporation as an instrument or alter ego. 185 Plaintiffs may also pierce the
corporate veil either “when the unity of interest and ownership that
separates the corporation from corporate individuals is no longer present . . .
[or] when adhering to the falsity of that separate existence between the
corporation and individuals would promote injustice.” 186
Amending state DAPT statutes to add a section “that allows victims,
who have successfully pierced the corporate veil of a settlor’s corporation,
to access the trust assets to satisfy their claims” may both disincentivize
officer malfeasance and provide justice for victims of corporate fraud. 187
Additionally, because of the high bar required to pierce the corporate

179. Wilson, supra note 48, at 792.
180. Id. at 794. Wilson discusses Bernie Madoff, a prominent securities trader whose corporate

misdeeds resulted in investors’ losses in excess of $50 billion. Victims of Madoff’s Ponzi scheme
only had access to approximately $1 billion worth of Madoff’s assets for their recovery which
illustrates the financial devastation experienced by victims of corporate malfeasance. See id.
181. Id. at 795.
182. Id. at 800.
183. Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 379 (7th Cir.
2008).
184. Michaels v. Banks, 959 F. Supp. 2d. 244, 245 (N.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting MAG Portfolio
Consultant, GMBH v. Merlin Biomed Group, LLC, 268 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 2001)).
185. Wilson, supra note 48, at 801.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 804.
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veil, 188 DAPTs would not be stripped of their liability shielding powers.
Further, states should amend their DAPT legislation because of the “lack of
sufficient means to access DAPT assets, public policy considerations, the
promotion of justice, and because such an amendment would not impose
hardship upon settlors or legislatures.” 189
The public policy concerns addressed in Part IV of this Note—such as
the ability of socially-beneficial professionals to protect hard-earned assets
versus the ability of individuals to engage in reckless business or
investment behaviors while sheltering their assets from creditors—are
partially mitigated by these proposed amendments. “Federal legislation that
would prohibit or restrict asset protection trusts is problematic.” 190
Historically, Congress has allowed states to determine which “debtor assets
should be exempt from creditor claims”; indeed, these state exemptions
typically survive in federal bankruptcy proceedings. 191 Enacting federal
statutes that establish restraints on asset protection trusts would represent a
break with Congress’s longstanding stance. 192 Additionally, any attempt by
Congress to place restrictions on asset protection trusts would be
controversial. 193 By amending state DAPT statutes to allow creditors who
have successfully pierced the corporate veil to access corporate officers’
assets in DAPTs, legislatures limit the ability of corporate bad actors to
shield assets while still maintaining attractive jurisdictional incentives for
trust settlors.194 Since the standard for piercing the corporate veil is so high,
only the DAPT assets of those corporate officers who have engaged in
serious corporate malfeasance would be available to their creditors.
Finally, every state should also adopt the UVTA. Those states who
allow DAPTs and choose to adopt the UVTA should include a provision
that acknowledges the tension between DAPTs’ enforceability and
fraudulent transfer law. In doing so, states will recognize the importance of
creditors’ rights while still maintaining its status as an attractive trust situs.
It is important for non-DAPT states to also adopt the UVTA to enact the
new choice of law rule codified in the new Section 10 of the UVTA. 195 As
discussed above in Part III, codifying the choice of law rule regarding
fraudulent transfers protects creditors by allowing them to structure
transactions with predictability, which will reduce transaction costs as well
as potential future litigation fees. 196
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CONCLUSION
Applying the foregoing analysis, DAPTs pose a threat to creditors,
allowing debtors to transfer money to trusts “with actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor” and shield their assets. 197 The
UVTA acknowledges that certain states allow DAPTs, but attempts to
protect creditors from debtors who might be taking advantage of DAPTs to
escape liability or to frustrate their creditors into settling for less money.
Accordingly, there are strong public policy arguments against allowing
DAPTs, and are even advertised by practitioners as a method of frustrating
creditors. 198 Finally, because DAPTs are a fairly recent development,
whether transfers to DAPTs will survive “challenges by creditors is open to
speculation . . . .” 199
Individual states should amend their DAPT statutes to allow assets
contained within a corporate officer’s DAPT to be accessible to victims of
corporate irresponsibility who successfully pierce the corporate veil of the
officer’s corporation as it seeks to disincentivize corporate malfeasance
without creating hardship for legislatures. 200 By adopting the UVTA, states
will establish a more predictable choice of law rule that will serve to reduce
litigation and transaction costs.
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